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Research
During the course of a pandemic, large quan-
tities of drugs are projected to be used to treat 
cases of influenza and influenza-associated 
complications (Lim 2007), mitigate the 
spread of the epidemic, and reduce the bur-
den on the health care system [U.S. Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
2010; World Health Organization 2009]. The 
drug use patterns associated with inter  vention 
meas  ures necessarily vary depending on the 
transmission potential of the new virus, its 
pathogenicity, and the rate of occurrence of 
mild to severe illness and complications.
Under any pandemic scenario, there is 
potential for environmental impact because 
most ingested anti  virals (used for prophy-
laxis as well as treatment) and anti  biotics 
(used to treat secondary bacterial infections 
such as pneumonia) are excreted from the 
human body and released into the waste-
water treatment system in a biologically active 
form (Singer et al. 2007, 2008). Anti  biotic 
and anti  viral use during an influenza pan-
demic can far exceed that of inter  pandemic 
use—particularly in the case of anti  virals, 
which are infrequently used in the United 
Kingdom for seasonal influenza (Kramarz 
et al. 2009)—and, as a result, presents a new 
and potentially significant eco  toxicologic 
challenge to waste  water treatment plants 
(WWTPs) and receiving rivers (PREPARE 
Initiative 2009).
Anti  biotic use, and its associated eco-
toxicologic hazards, might be reduced by 
assuming a systematic use of anti  viral drugs to 
mitigate the likelihood and severity of influenza 
infections and resulting complications, includ-
ing bacterial pneumonia (Kaiser et al. 2003; 
Yu et al. 2010). However, the concomitant 
increase in anti  viral use in an effort to reduce 
secondary bacterial infections could exacer-
bate any eco  toxicologic hazard associated with 
the anti  viral. Disruption of micro  organisms 
responsible for nutrient removal in WWTPs 
from the combined eco  toxicologic effects of 
anti  biotic and anti  viral exposure could result in 
insufficiently treated waste  water entering the 
receiving rivers, leading to eutrophication, loss 
of aquatic life, and fish kills. Similar environ-
mental effects have been witnessed in areas 
after periods of brief but intense heavy rainfall, 
which forces raw sewage directly into receiving 
rivers (Even et al. 2004); this phenomenon 
is particular to areas employing combined 
sewage overflows, as is the case in much of 
the United Kingdom. These scenarios typify 
the risk induced by inter  dependencies among 
social systems, infra    structures, and the environ-
ment; the failure of a single entity or cluster of 
entities can cause a chain reaction, which can 
disrupt the entire system.
In this article we provide the first quan-
titative assessment of the potential environ-
mental hazards associated with the medical 
response to a pandemic. We focus on the 
Thames catchment in England as a case study 
(Figure 1), because it is one of the most popu-
lous and production-dense river catchments 
in the world (Merrett 2007). To quantify the 
relevant environmental risk, we integrated a 
spatially structured global epidemic model 
with a water quality model and toxicity 
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Ba c k g r o u n d: The global public health community has closely monitored the unfolding of the 
2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic to best mitigate its impact on society. However, little attention has 
been given to the impact of this response on the environment. Anti  virals and anti  biotics prescribed 
to treat influenza are excreted into waste  water in a biologically active form, which presents a new 
and potentially significant eco  toxicologic challenge to micro  organisms responsible for waste  water 
nutrient removal in waste  water treatment plants (WWTPs) and receiving rivers.
oBjectives: We assessed the eco  toxicologic risks of a pandemic influenza medical response.
Me t h o d s : To evaluate this risk, we coupled a global spatially structured epidemic model that 
simulates the quantities of anti  virals and anti  biotics used during an influenza pandemic of vary-
ing severity and a water quality model applied to the Thames catchment to determine predicted 
environ  mental concentrations. An additional model was then used to assess the effects of anti  biotics 
on micro  organisms in WWTPs and rivers.
re s u l t s: Consistent with expectations, our model projected a mild pandemic to exhibit a negligible 
eco  toxicologic hazard. In a moderate and severe pandemic, we projected WWTP toxicity to vary 
between 0–14% and 5–32% potentially affected fraction (PAF), respectively, and river toxicity to 
vary between 0–14% and 0–30% PAF, respectively, where PAF is the fraction of microbial species 
predicted to be growth inhibited (lower and upper 95% reference range).
co n c l u s i o n s : The current medical response to pandemic influenza might result in the discharge 
of insufficiently treated waste  water into receiving rivers, thereby increasing the risk of eutrophica-
tion and contamination of drinking water abstraction points. Widespread drugs in the environment 
could hasten the generation of drug resistance. Our results highlight the need for empirical data on 
the effects of anti  biotics and anti  viral medications on WWTPs and freshwater ecotoxicity.
key w o r d s : anti  biotics, anti  viral, bacterial pneumonia, ecotoxicity, epidemiologic modeling, influ-
enza, pandemic, Tamiflu, waste  water treatment plant. Environ Health Perspect 119:1084–1090 
(2011).  doi:10.1289/ehp.1002757 [Online 2 March 2011]Ecotoxicologic risks during an influenza pandemic
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models to produce ab initio estimates of drug 
use patterns, estimates of their release into 
WWTPs, projected levels of contamination 
of the receiving rivers, and resulting microbial 
ecotoxicity.
Methods
Epidemic simulations. We used the Global 
Epidemic and Mobility (GLEaM) model 
(Balcan et al. 2009a) to generate in silico epi-
demics, simulating the numbers of influenza 
cases and secondary bacterial infection cases at 
each stage of disease progression and the quan-
tities of anti  viral drugs (used for prophylaxis 
and treatment) and anti  biotics (used to treat 
secondary bacterial infections) used within 
each geographic census area, with projections 
down to the spatial resolution scale of 0.25° 
and a time resolution of 1 day. A detailed 
description of the model and model param-
eters is provided in Supplemental Material, 
Section 1 (doi:10.1289/ehp.1002757). 
In brief, the model mapped 6 billion indi-
viduals and integrated mobility data at the 
worldwide scale, including air travel and 
commuting patterns, to simulate the spread 
of infection among 3,362 geographic census 
area sub  populations defined around airports 
in 220 countries (Balcan et al. 2009a). The 
model simulates the evolution of influenza 
within each sub  population, with each indi-
vidual classified as susceptible, latent, infec-
tious symptomatic, infectious asymptomatic, 
or permanently recovered/removed at each 
point in time (see Supplemental Material, 
Figure 2). The model accounts for seasonal 
effects through standard a priori assumptions 
on seasonal rescaling of influenza transmis-
sibility (Balcan et al. 2009a; Colizza et al. 
2007; Cooper et al. 2006) (see Supplemental 
Material, Table 1). The compartmentalization 
accounting for the development of influenza-
associated complications (Balcan et al. 2009b) 
were based on the U.K. pandemic assumptions 
for complication, hospitalization, and inten-
sive care unit admission rates (Balcan et al. 
2009b; U.K. Department of Health 2009) 
(see Supplemental Material, Table 2). All epi-
demic simulations were initiated with a single 
symptomatic infectious individual and were 
allowed to evolve for 1 year. We considered 
for the analysis only simulations that resulted 
in a global outbreak, defined as the generation 
of new symptomatic cases in more than one 
country. Initial conditions assumed that the 
pandemic would start in Hanoi, Vietnam, on 
1 October (Colizza et al. 2007). The integra-
tion of short- and long-range mobility infra-
structures, and detailed demographic data with 
a seasonality scaling that impacts geographic 
areas differently, allowed for a fine-grained 
description of the epidemic.
Given the large uncertainties associated 
with an emerging influenza pandemic, we 
explored different scenarios, ranging from mild 
transmission potential with a basic reproduc-
tive number (R0) of 1.65, to a moderate situa-
tion where R0 = 1.9, to a severe scenario where 
R0 = 2.3. R0 indicates the average number of 
infections generated by an infectious individ-
ual in a fully susceptible population (Anderson 
and May 1991). These R0 values, which are 
consistent with recent estimates of the cur-
rent H1N1 pandemic (CDC 2010; Fraser 
et al. 2009; Yang et al. 2009) up to available 
estimates for the 1918 pandemic (Mills et al. 
2004), correspond to the nominal values of R0 
and, as such, do not reflect the seasonal influ-
ence on R0, which is accounted for within the 
GLEaM model (Colizza et al. 2007; Cooper 
et al. 2006).
In addition to analyzing eco  toxicologic 
hazards corresponding to differing levels of 
pandemic severity, we also considered differ-
ent pharmaceutical mitigation strategies that 
we assumed differed according to the selected 
transmission scenarios. In the case of a mild 
pandemic (R0 = 1.65), we assumed no large-
scale anti  viral treatment (AVT), consistent 
with the response meas  ures implemented 
during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic (CDC 
2010; U.K. Department of Health 2009; 
World Health Organization 2009). For 
moderate and severe pandemic scenarios, we 
assumed the implementation of AVT with 
Tamiflu (F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd, Basel, 
Switzerland) in all countries with available 
stockpiles [see Supplemental Material, Figure 4 
(doi:10.1289/ehp.1002757)] (Colizza et al. 
2007; Singer et al. 2008). This mitigation strat-
egy was modeled assuming a conservative 30% 
successful case detection and anti  viral treat-
ment AVT rate (Balcan et al. 2009c; Colizza 
et al. 2007; Flusurvey.org.uk 2010). We 
assumed AVT resulted in a 1-day reduction of 
the infectious period, a reduced transmissibility 
of the infection, and a reduced complication 
rate (see Supplemental Material, Section 1 and 
Table 1) (Balcan et al. 2009b; Ferguson et al. 
2006; Germann et al. 2006). We also evalu-
ated the effects of anti  viral prophylaxis (AVP) 
provided to 0.1% or 1% of the population for 
2 or 4 weeks, respectively, from the start of the 
outbreak (Ferguson et al. 2006; Germann et al. 
2006; Health Protection Agency 2009). The 
case with no prophylaxis was also considered. 
We based our assumptions regarding anti  biotic 
treatment for influenza-associated complica-
tions on the empirical guidelines of the British 
Infection Society, British Thoracic Society, and 
Health Protection Agency (Lim 2007) (see 
Supplemental Material, Table 3). Full details 
and sensitivity analysis on these parameters are 
reported in Supplemental Material, Section 1.
Environmental fate and ecotoxicity analy-
sis. The coupling of the GLEaM model with 
a point-source water quality model, Low 
Flows 2000—Water Quality Extension 
(LF2000-WQX) (Rowney et al. 2009), 
allowed for an accurate description of the 
evolution of the pandemic and the environ-
mental release of anti  viral medications and 
Figure 1. Illustration of the Thames River Basin boundary. Dark blue represents river stretches receiving 
WWTP effluent within the LF2000‑WQX; light blue represents river stretches upstream of the first WWTP 
found within the LF2000‑WQX. A river stretch is defined by the length of river bounded at both ends by an 
input to or abstraction from the river (e.g., another river, WWTP, drainage canal, abstraction point). 
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anti  biotics. First, we estimated drug excretion 
into WWTPs based on the GLEaM model 
and pharmacologic data concerning the per-
centage of each drug released in the feces and 
urine as the parent chemical or as a biologically 
active metabolite [for details, see Supplemental 
Material, Section 2 and Table 4 (doi:10.1289/
ehp.1002757)]. We used LF2000-WQX to 
estimate spatially explicit statistical distribu-
tions of river concentrations of anti  virals and 
anti  biotics discharged from WWTPs after 
accounting for dilution and dissipation pro-
cesses in the river (see Supplemental Material, 
Section 3). The LF2000-WQX software 
(Keller and Young 2004; Williams et al. 2009) 
is a geographic information-based system that 
uses a Monte Carlo mixing-model approach to 
combine statistical estimates of chemical loads 
at specific emission points (e.g., WWTPs) 
with estimated river flow duration curves to 
generate spatially explicit statistical distribu-
tions of chemicals for the whole river net-
work. For this analysis, we assumed that the 
pharmaceutical load in WWTP influent per 
person per day constant and fixed at the mean 
peak value for the pandemic. In addition, we 
assumed that WWTPs were the only sources 
of drugs, that drugs were not removed in the 
WWTP or degraded in the water column, and 
that background concentrations in the river 
stretches and lateral inflows were zero. 
Assumptions and sensitivity analysis for 
the analysis of ecotoxicity are described in 
detail in Supplemental Material, Section 4 
(doi:10.1289/ehp.1002757). In brief, we 
focused our eco  toxicologic analysis on eight 
anti  biotics (amoxicillin, cefotaxime, cefu-
roxime, clarithromycin, doxycycline, eryth-
romycin, levofloxacin, and moxifloxacin), 
because Tamiflu itself has not been shown to 
exhibit acute toxicity (Accinelli et al. 2010; 
Bartels and von Tümpling 2008; Hutchinson 
et al. 2009; Kelleher and Dempsey 2007; Saccà 
et al. 2009; Straub 2009). The eco  toxicologic 
hazard posed by each scenario and its respec-
tive anti  biotic use pattern was meas  ured in 
terms of the “potentially affected fraction” 
(PAF) of microbial species within a WWTP 
or a river, which was projected to be growth 
inhibited by anti  biotics exposure. The PAF was 
calculated by use of bacterial species sensitivity 
distributions of anti  biotic toxicity constructed 
from compilations of minimum inhibitory 
concentrations (MICs; see Supplemental 
Material, Figure 8). Because anti  biotic sen-
sitivity data for micro  organisms in WWTPs 
(i.e., the micro  organisms responsible for the 
removal of nutrients from waste  water before 
discharge into receiving rivers) are limited, we 
based effect assessments on MICs of predomi-
nantly clinically relevant micro  organisms from 
the European Committee on Antimicrobial 
Susceptibility Testing (EUCAST) breakpoint 
database (EUCAST 2009). The database 
includes breakpoints from resistance surveil-
lance programs, published articles, the pharma-
ceutical industry, veterinary programs, and 
individual laboratories. We accounted for the 
presence of multiple anti  biotics through mix-
ture toxicity models (De Zwart and Posthuma 
2005). A PAF of 5% was used as a pragmatic 
threshold to define the maximum fraction of 
Figure 2. Predicted toxicity to micro  organisms in WWTPs and river stretches resulting from exposure to anti  biotics during influenza pandemics. Scenarios: 
s1, AVP = 0, rate of AVT = 30%, limited supply of Tamiflu; s2, 2 week AVP, AVP = 0.1%, rate of AVT = 30%, limited supply of Tamiflu; s3, 4 week AVP, AVP = 0.1%, 
rate of AVT = 30%, limited supply of Tamiflu; s4, 2 week AVP, AVP = 1%, rate of AVT = 30%, limited supply of Tamiflu; s5, 4 week AVP, AVP = 1%, rate of AVT = 30%, 
limited supply of Tamiflu; s6, AVP = 0, rate of AVT = 30%, unlimited supply of Tamiflu. (A,C,D) Percentage of WWTPs (A), river stretches (C), and river length (total 
length of the river stretches in the Thames River Basin; D) predicted to exceed the toxicity threshold of 5% PAF by transmission scenario (mild, moderate, and 
severe). Values shown are median and 95% RRs obtained from the drug use pattern predicted by the 1,000 stochastic runs of the GLEaM model. No bar is visible 
when the median value equals zero; this is the case, for example, for the mild and moderate scenarios. Note that anti  viral treatment is assumed in the moderate 
and severe pandemic scenarios only, with 30% case detection and drug administration. Intervention with anti  virals is modeled by assuming that each country has 
limited stockpiles of the drug [s1–s5; see Supplemental Material, Figure 4 (doi:10.1289/ehp.1002757)] (Colizza et al. 2007; Singer et al. 2008) or that each country 
can count on a hypothetical unlimited supply of drugs (s6). PAF calculations are based on the anti  biotic sensitivity distributions of human pathogens and a com‑
bination of two mixture toxicity models. (B and E) Absolute toxicity, shown as a percentage of microbial species predicted to be growth inhibited (PAF) per each 
WWTP (B) and river stretch (E) according to the pharmaceutical mitigating conditions explored, in the mild, moderate, and severe transmission scenarios. 
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species present in a community that could 
be inhibited without any anticipated loss of 
function to the “system” (European Chemicals 
Agency 2008).
Effects of Tamiflu on bacterial biofilms. 
Soong et al. (2006) demonstrated the effi-
ciency of oseltamivir carboxylate (OC; the 
active metabolite of Tamiflu) to inhibit bio-
film formation of the pathogen Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa (Soong et al. 2006). The extent to 
which Tamiflu and OC will inhibit biofilm 
formation in environmentally relevant strains 
of micro  organisms in WWTPs is unknown, 
but such inhibition could interfere with the 
nutrient-removing micro  organisms within 
WWTPs and thereby contribute to WWTP 
failure and contamination of receiving rivers 
and downstream drinking water. Moreover, 
there is a risk that the effects might be fur-
ther exaggerated when combined with a high 
load of anti  biotics, as we projected in this 
study. Therefore, we used a cell attachment 
assay to determine the influence of Tamiflu 
exposure on biofilm formation of environ-
mentally relevant bacterial strains (Djordjevic 
et al. 2002; O’Toole and Kolter 1998), as 
described in detail in Supplemental Material, 
Section 5 (doi:10.1289/ehp.1002757). In 
brief, we exposed nine environmental micro-
organisms and one clini  cal micro  organism 
(see Supplemental Material, Table 7) to two 
concentrations of OC [28.4 and 284 mM 
(0.1 and 1.0 mg/L, respectively)] and observed 
the relative differences in the extent of biofilm 
formation in a 96-well plate format. 
Results
For each pandemic scenario, we first estimated 
the quantity of anti  biotics and anti  virals reach-
ing WWTPs at the peak of the pandemic. In 
the case of a mild pandemic (R0 = 1.65), we 
projected anti  biotic use to increase by a negli-
gible 1% over inter  pandemic use of the same 
anti  biotics reported for England in 2007–2008 
[95% reference range (RR), 0.4–23%; for esti-
mated background anti  biotic use during inter-
pandemic periods, see Supplemental Material, 
Table 5 (doi:10.1289/ehp.1002757)]. We 
obtained the RR from the RR of the drug use 
pattern predicted by the GLEaM model. Anti-
biotic use was projected to increase by 13% 
(95% RR, 1–83%) and 252% (95% RR, 158–
279%), respectively, over inter  pandemic use 
for moderate and severe transmission scenarios 
with 30% of cases receiving AVT intervention.
Projected microbial ecotoxicity for each 
WWTP for the different transmission scenarios 
and pharmaceutical interventions are shown in 
Figures 2B and 3A–C. The entire RR of toxic-
ity in the mild pandemic is below the toxicity 
threshold of 5% PAF for all WWTPs. In a 
moderate pandemic, projected WWTP toxic-
ity varied between 0–3% and 0–14% PAF for 
the least and most affected WWTPs, respec-
tively (ranges represent the lower and upper 
95% RRs). In the moderate pandemic scenario 
(R0 = 1.9), we projected the median number 
of WWTPs in the Thames River Basin with a 
PAF > 5% to be 0, but the upper 95% bound 
of the RR was > 74%, reflecting a realistic 
worst-case scenario (Figure 2A). In a severe 
pandemic, projected WWTP toxicity varied 
between 5–9% and 22–32% PAF for the least 
and most affected WWTPs, respectively. A 
PAF > 5% was projected in nearly all of the 
WWTPs when the lower bound of the 95% 
RR was considered in a severe pandemic.
A mild and moderate pandemic are 
unlikely to pose a significant eco  toxicologic 
hazard in the Thames basin, as shown in 
Figures 2C,D and 3D–F. Mean concen-
trations of total anti  biotics in the Thames 
catchment were projected to be < 0.09 and 
< 0.8 μg/L for a mild and moderate pan-
demic, respectively (Table 1). In a moder-
ate pandemic, projected river toxicity varied 
between 0 to < 1% and 0–14% PAF (ranges 
represent lower and upper 95% RR) for 
the least and most affected river stretches, 
respectively (Figure 2C,E). [A river stretch 
is defined by the length of river bounded at 
both ends by an input to or abstraction from 
the river (e.g., another river, WWTP, drain-
age canal, abstraction point).] In a severe pan-
demic, projected river toxicity varied between 
0 to ≤ 1% and 21–30% PAF for the least 
and most affected river stretches, respec-
tively. We projected a severe pandemic to 
average < 15 μg/L for the sum of anti  biotics 
and result in a maximum environmental con-
centration of 80 μg/L. These concentrations 
would exceed the 5% PAF threshold in about 
half the river stretches under all prophylaxis 
interventions considering the upper bound 
of the 95% RR (lower bound > 30%), equat-
ing to approximately 35–40% of the total 
Figure 3. Maps showing the predicted toxicity of waste  water in WWTPs (A–C) and river stretches (D–F) corresponding to the drug use patterns shown in 
Figure 1C,D and Supplemental Material, Figure 3 (doi:10.1289/ehp.1002757), respectively, assuming no AVP. Toxicity values are binned and color coded as in 
Figure 2B and E. In A, individual WWTPs are indicated by circles that are scaled to indicate the size of the population served by each plant.
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river length within the basin (lower bound, 
15–18%; Figure 3F). [River length was evalu-
ated on the total length of the river stretches 
in the Thames River Basin.] 
The same WWTPs or rivers generated 
the highest ecotoxicity risk across the set of 
interventions explored for any one transmis-
sion scenario (Figure 2B,E). The WWTPs 
at higher eco  toxicologic risk are often ones 
serving larger populations (Figure 3A–C). 
Both WWTPs and river stretches reach-
ing the highest toxicity values tended to be 
located closer to London, where most drink-
ing water abstraction points are located for the 
London area (Rowney et al. 2009). Hence, 
the increased risk of drinking water contami-
nation might result in the need for additional 
water treatment measures.
Inter  pandemic use of Tamiflu in the 
United Kingdom has been reported to be neg-
ligible (Kramarz et al. 2009), implying that 
any substantial increase will result from the 
pandemic. We projected a mild and moderate 
pandemic with AVP > 0, to generate mean 
concentrations of OC (the active form of the 
prodrug Tamiflu) between 1.1 and 11.5 μg/L 
in the Thames catchment (Table 1). A more 
severe pandemic, regardless of AVP, was pro-
jected to result in mean concentrations of OC 
> 100 μg/L, which is consistent with previous 
projections of a severe pandemic in southern 
England (Singer et al. 2007).
In the biofilm formation assay, we observed 
statistically significant (p < 0.05) declines in 
biofilm formation relative to control in 20% 
and 10% of the cases when bacteria were 
exposed to 0.1 mg/L and 1 mg/L OC, respec-
tively [see Supplemental Material, Section 5 
and Figure 12 (doi:10.1289/ehp.1002757)].
Discussion
To our knowledge, this is the most compre-
hensive study to date to estimate environ-
mental concentrations of pharmaceuticals, 
at a catchment scale, for an influenza pan-
demic, because it includes pandemics of vary-
ing severities and mitigation strategies. This is 
the first study to identify the eco  toxicologic 
hazard to WWTPs from anti  biotic use dur-
ing an influenza pandemic, as well as the first 
to attempt to quantify the nature of hazard 
posed by the anti  viral medication Tamiflu to 
microbial biofilm formation.
High concentrations of neuraminidase 
inhibitor anti  virals, such as Tamiflu, zana-
mivir, and peramivir, might result in acute 
ecotoxicity during an influenza pandemic, 
although existing literature suggests little cause 
for concern for typical fresh  water and marine 
ecotoxicology assay organisms (Accinelli 
et al. 2010; Escher et al. 2010; Hutchinson 
et al. 2009; Singer et al. 2008; Straub 2009). 
However, there is growing evidence to suggest 
that high concentrations of neuraminidase 
inhibitors in WWTPs and the environment 
might increase the risk of disrupting microbial 
biofilms, which has implications for WWTP 
floc and biofilm stability and the removal of 
nutrients from waste  water before discharge 
into receiving rivers (Singer et al. 2008). Slater 
et al. (2011) simulated influenza-pandemic 
dosing of anti  biotics and anti  virals for 8 weeks 
in an aerobic granular sludge sequencing 
batch reactor, operated for enhanced biologi-
cal phosphorus removal (EBPR). They found 
evidence of changes to bacterial community 
structure and disruption to EBPR and nitrifi-
cation during and after high-OC dosing. That 
study indicated the risk of destabilizing micro-
bial consortia in WWTPs as a result of high 
concentrations of bioactive pharmaceuticals 
during an influenza pandemic. 
Parker et al. (2009) showed that OC 
signifi  cantly inhibits Streptococcus pneumo-
niae NanA sialidase as reflected in decreased 
biofilm formation, with an IC50 (concen-
tration necessary to inhibit enzyme activ-
ity by 50%) of 2 mM (568 mg/L) and an 
IC30 of 28.4 mg/L. They reported an IC20 of 
10 μM OC (2.84 mg/L), which reflects the 
lowest tested concentration, but the decline 
in biofilm formation was not statistically 
significant (p > 0.05) (Parker et al. 2009). 
Soong et al. (2006) demon  strated similar lev-
els of inhibition in Psueodomonas aeruginosa 
NanP sialidase with an approximate IC50 of 
2.5 mg/L, nearly identical to that of NanP. 
Notably, Soong et al. (2006) demonstrated 
that peramivir had an IC50 of approximately 
25 μM (8.2 mg/L) and an IC30 at a much 
lower, more environmentally relevant concen-
tration of 0.025 μM (8.2 μg/L).
In a preliminary assay, we exposed nine 
environmental micro  organisms and one 
clinical micro  organism to two concentra-
tions of Tamiflu and observed statistically 
significant (p < 0.05) declines in biofilm for-
mation. Although we assayed the parent com-
pound Tamiflu rather than its active anti  viral 
metabolite (OC), 20% of the parent chemical 
reached the environment and thus has envi-
ronmental significance in terms of biofilm 
exposure. The mechanism of biofilm inhi-
bition by neuraminidase inhibitors remains 
undetermined.
We argue that there will be increasing 
risk during an influenza pandemic of anti-
biotic-mediated disruption of WWTP micro-
organisms. Increased anti  biotic exposure could 
compromise vital and obligate microbial func-
tions in WWTPs such as ammonium oxida-
tion and nitrogen and phosphorus removal 
(Alighardashi et al. 2009; Louvet et al. 2010a, 
2010b; Singer et al. 2008). Because pandemic 
influenza is likely to peak in winter months, 
the highest drug load will pass through 
WWTPs at their least effective time period, 
thereby maximizing the likelihood of WWTPs 
breaching compliance on discharged waste-
water (PREPARE Initiative 2009).
Notably, we based the hazards identified 
in this study on MIC values of clinically rele-
vant micro  organisms, because experimental 
data on anti  biotic toxicity in WWTPs are 
Table 1. Projected concentrations of anti  biotics and Tamiflu in the Thames River Basin. 
Antibiotics (μg/L) Tamiflu (μg/L)
Scenario Mean ± SD Maximum Mean ± SD Maximum
R0 = 1.65
s1 0.085 ± 0.088 0.476 0.186 ± 0.192 1.04
s2 0.082 ± 0.084 0.445 1.12 ± 1.15 6.09
s3 0.083 ± 0.084 0.447 1.20 ± 1.21 6.47
s4 0.073 ± 0.074 0.400 11.1 ± 11.2 60.8
s5 0.070 ± 0.072 0.384 11.1 ± 11.3 60.6
s6 0.013 ± 0.014 0.073 0.027 ± 0.027 0.149
R0 = 1.9
s1 0.741 ± 0.744 3.95 1.00 ± 1.00 5.31
s2 0.690 ± 0.706 3.77 1.16 ± 1.19 6.33
s3 0.719 ± 0.731 3.90 1.47 ± 1.49 7.96
s4 0.552 ± 0.563 3.01 11.0 ± 11.2 60.0
s5 0.418 ± 0.427 2.27 11.5 ± 11.7 62.4
s6 0.294 ± 0.298 1.59 0.37 ± 0.38 2.02
R0 = 2.1
s1 14.8 ± 15.0 80.5 21.3 ± 21.3 102
s2 14.5 ± 14.8 80.6 21.0 ± 21.3 103
s3 14.5 ± 14.8 79.9 21.1 ± 21.2 102
s4 14.0 ± 14.2 75.9 20.7 ± 20.8 99.1
s5 13.1 ± 13.3 69.3 19.6 ± 19.9 103
s6 13.2 ± 13.4 72.3 19.6 ± 20.0 108
Scenarios: s1, AVP = 0, rate of AVT = 30%, limited supply of Tamiflu (i.e., based on the available stockpiles of each coun‑
try) [see Supplemental Material, Figure 4 (doi:10.1289/ehp.1002757)]; s2, 2 weeks of AVP, AVP = 0.1%, rate of AVT = 30%, 
limited supply of Tamiflu; s3, 4 weeks of AVP, AVP = 0.1%, rate of AVT = 30%, limited supply of Tamiflu; s4, 2 weeks of AVP, 
AVP = 1%, rate of AVT = 30%, limited supply of Tamiflu; s5, 4 weeks of AVP, AVP = 1%, rate of AVT = 30%, limited supply 
of Tamiflu; s6, AVP = 0, rate of AVT = 30%, unlimited supply of Tamiflu, (i.e., assuming that each country can count on 
unlimited stockpiles of Tamiflu). Mean values are inclusive of all excreted anti  biotics. Values reflect the median epidemic 
scenario for each condition and the mean concentration for all 461 river stretches used within the LF2000‑WQX model.Ecotoxicologic risks during an influenza pandemic
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too scarce to be used for effects modeling. 
Potentially, the toxicity of anti  biotics to 
WWTP micro  organisms might differ from 
their effects on the clinically relevant micro-
organisms within the EUCAST database. 
Also, the organization of bacteria into biofilms 
will undoubtedly influence anti  biotic toxicity 
in situ. However, recent data on erythromycin 
toxicity obtained in activated sewage sludge 
batch reactors show that MIC-based predic-
tions agree with test results of an anti  biotic 
“shock” (Louvet et al. 2010b). Within the 
variability of the experimental data, projected 
toxicity matched experimentally determined 
effects [see Supplemental Material, Section 4.5 
and Table 6 (doi:10.1289/ehp.1002757)]. 
We therefore argue that it is defendable to 
use MIC values as a first approximation of 
anti  biotic effects and at the same time stress 
the need for verification of possible effects 
in experimental studies. Should the WWTP 
micro  organisms survive the initial toxic effects 
of the bolus of pharmaceuticals at the outset 
of a pandemic, increased biofilm thickness, 
changes in community composition, and hor-
izontal transfer of anti  biotic resistance might 
contribute to preserving WWTP function 
during a pandemic.
Sublethal levels of anti  biotics have been 
shown to promote the development of anti-
biotic resistance in bacteria. Each potential 
extrinsic source of resistance genes, either in 
the environment or among commensal organ-
isms, increases the chance of acquired resistance 
in a pathogen (Knapp et al. 2009), thereby 
potentially hastening the appearance of anti-
biotic resistant bacteria in humans (Smith et al. 
2002). Hence, increased anti  biotic use and 
release into the environment during an influ-
enza pandemic might increase the environ-
mental reservoir of anti  biotic resistance, which 
has short- and long-term public health impli-
cations. Similarly, the release of active anti-
virals into rivers might hasten the generation of 
anti  viral-resistant viruses in influenza-infected 
wildfowl, as previously discussed (Singer et al. 
2007, 2008; Söderström et al. 2009).
Intervention strategies for the mitigation 
of a pandemic can strongly vary across coun-
tries, depending on policies and outbreaks 
experienced. In the moderate and severe 
transmission scenarios, we assumed that AVT 
was administered to 30% of influenza cases 
and considered varying values of the rate of 
complications. Larger administration rates 
of anti  viral drugs for treatment may further 
reduce the incidence of secondary infections 
during the pandemic, thus reducing anti  biotic 
use and its associated environmental risk, but 
at the cost of increasing the eco  toxicologic 
effects from additional anti  viral use. A reduc-
tion in anti  biotic use might alternatively be 
achieved through the use of a prepandemic/
universal influenza vaccine (Leroux-Roels and 
Leroux-Roels 2009), as well as a multi  valent 
pneumonia vaccination campaign (CDC 
2009; Chien et al. 2010; U.K. Department of 
Health 2007). 
Conclusions
Widespread WWTP failures were not reported 
during the current H1N1 pandemic, as was 
projected by this study for a mild transmission 
scenario. However, future pandemics, depend-
ing on their severity, might test the resilience 
of WWTPs because of increased pharmaceuti-
cal use. Even a relatively small decline in the 
ability of WWTP micro  organisms to remove 
waste  water nutrients (< 10%) could result in a 
significant pollution event when compounded 
for all WWTPs within a river. The projected 
ecotoxic effects of anti  virals and anti  biotics 
on WWTP biofilms could be considerable at 
the peak of a moderate or severe pandemic. 
Our current knowledge base is inadequate to 
rule out the potential for disruptions to waste-
water treatment, widespread river pollution, 
degradation of drinking water quality, and the 
spread of anti  viral and anti  biotic resistance. 
The global nature of the GLEaM model and 
the availability of other regional catchment 
models enable the application of this study to 
other conditions and catchments. The data on 
the 2009 pandemic should be seen as a win-
dow of opportunity to gain further insight into 
the unique risks posed by a robust pharma-
ceuti  cal response to influenza pandemics as it 
relates to the local environment, climate, and 
demographics.
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